toxicity. For a given mass of particles, surface area increases dramatically as the diameter of the individual particles decreases. This increased surface-area-to-mass ratio appears to be a critical feature in understanding some aspects of the toxicity of nanomaterials. For example, in a study comparing the toxicity of conventional versus nano-sized particles of titanium dioxide, the nanoparticles appeared significantly more toxic than the conventional particles when the dose was reported on a mass basis, but this distinction essentially disappeared when the dose was reported on a surface area basis.10 The higher surface area also leads to higher particle surface energy, which may translate into higher reactivity.11 Lastly, the combination of high surface area and small size may give nanoparticles unusual, catalytic reactivity, such as those seen with gold nanoparticles.12 This combination of enhanced surface area and enhanced surface activity lends far greater complexity to the characterization of nanoparticles when compared to bulk and conventional substances, and also precludes easy extrapolation about potential toxicity.
Moreover, at least some nanoparticles can readily penetrate cell membranes, which enables them to deliver targeted drug therapies. Evidence suggests that some nanoparticles can also cross physiologic barriers (including the lung-blood, bloodbrain, and placental barriers), and can enter body compartments that neither larger particles nor smaller molecules can readily access. One study of twenty nanometer polystyrene beads suggests that they enter cells by passing directly through membranes, without requiring specific transport mechanisms. Once inside the cells, the nanoparticles distribute throughout the cytoplasm and appear to bind to a variety of key cellular structures.13
Surface modifications may allow nanoparticles to bind to cell surface receptors and potentially to interact with internal cell structures.14 Subtle variations in nanoparticle surfaces, whether due to intentional coating prior to entry into the body, unintentional surface binding, or coating degradation once inside the body, can have dramatic impacts on where and how nanoparticles gain entry into organs and cells, as well as where and how they are transported after entry. These complexities increase the difficulty of understanding nanomaterial hazards.
In addition to these inherent characteristics, the limited empirical data available adds to the concerns. As of yet, no studies on any nanomaterialÂ's reproductive toxicity, immunotoxicity, developmental toxicity, or chronic health effects, such as cancer, have been published, although some are underway. 15 The limited number of short-term studies completed to date demonstrate a variety of adverse effects. Studies in which single-walled carbon nanotubes (Â"SWCNTsÂ") were implanted into the lungs of rodents have consistently demonstrated that they cause unusual lung granulomas and have shown other signs of lung inflammation. 16 Moreover, one study found that ones.23 However, some scientists have questioned whether observed toxicity is caused by contaminants, specifically organic solvents, rather than the fullerenes themselves, and have pointed to studies that show negligible toxicity and even protective effects from pristine fullerenes that are made into water-soluble aggregates, without the use of organic solvents. 24 This alternate hypothesis, however, disregards indications that the fullerene aggregates produced without solvents are significantly larger, and thus less able to penetrate cells, than those formed with solvents. This ongoing debate highlights the importance of understanding nanomaterialsÂ' physical form, as well as the limitations of current scientific understanding about nanomaterial toxicity.
Finally, quantum dots can be composed of a variety of inherently toxic materials, including cadmium and lead. Because some of the key potential applications of quantum dots include diagnostic imaging and medical therapeutics, quantum dots have been studied relatively extensively in biological systems. However, only a small portion of this research has focused on potential toxicity, and those studies performed to date have mainly been in vitro assays. While results have been somewhat inconsistent, studies that used longer exposure times were more likely to demonstrate significant toxicity.25 Inorganic elements typically make up the core of quantum dots, but these elements are generally coated with organic materials, such as polyethylene glycol, in order to enhance their biocompatibility or target them to specific organs or cells. While many coatings initially decrease toxicity by one or more orders of magnitude, the coatings might degrade when exposed to air or ultraviolet light, which could lead to toxicity increases. While the presumption has been that this cytotoxicity is caused by leakage of cadmium or selenium from the core, there is evidence that some of the molecules used as coatings may have independent toxicity.26 NANOMATERIAL EXPOSURES: A LIFECYCLE VIEW Some nanomaterials now on the market, and others in development, can clearly result in human and environmental exposures to nanoparticles. Examples include uses in drugs and cosmetics, and remediation of groundwater contamination.
However, other products may also lead to substantial exposure, though the exposure does not necessarily occur during a productÂ's useful life. For example, nanotubes or other nanomaterials embedded within resins or other matrices may be incorporated into tennis rackets, automobile running boards, or other products. Although risk of exposure to these nanotubes (which, as noted above, have been shown to damage lung tissue)27 appears minimal during product use, pre-and post-use exposure must also be considered. Such exposure may occur during the manufacture of the product and its components, or during disposal, recycling, or reclamation. Human and environmental exposure during these other stages may be substantial. For instance, although computer users are highly unlikely to inhale carbon nanotubes bound in their computer screen, the exposure potential may dramatically increase if recyclers ultimately grind up those screens for other uses, such as road aggregate. Human exposure is most obvious for the workers doing the grinding, but may also harm road-construction workers, travelers, and neighbors as the roadÂ's surface weathers with time and traffic. Occupational exposure to researchers and students may also occur in research and development settings. In sum, it is necessary to consider a productÂ's complete lifecycle in order to understand the effects of exposure and address risks effectively.
Presently, quantitative data on exposure to nanomaterials are almost nonexistent. However, sources indicate that numerous nanomaterial-containing products are entering commerce, thus creating the potential for human and environmental exposure at various stages of their lifecycles. More informally, an eBay search using the word Â"nanoÂ" produces items such as golf clubs, tennis racquets, face lotions, and sun blocks; notably, however, these references may reflect marketing initiatives rather than actual nanomaterial use. Certain nanomaterials are also readily available for direct purchase, as illustrated by a Google search producing sources for nanotubes, buckyballs, quantum dots, and metal oxide nanoparticles. 
NANOMATERIAL RISKS: WILL EXISTING REGULATORY PROGRAMS PROTECT WORKERS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE ENVIRONMENT?
Effectively managing nanomaterialsÂ' potential risks will prove to be a challenge for existing occupational and environmental regulatory frameworks for at least five reasons. First, in most of the current regulatory programs, standards and their exemptions are based on mass and mass concentration. Because of their high surface-area-to-mass ratios, and enhanced surface activity, nanomaterials are likely to prove potent at far lower concentration levels than envisioned when these thresholds were initially set.
Second, although regulators can often reasonably predict at least some types of toxicity for new conventional materials based on extrapolation from conventional materials having a similar chemical structure, too little is currently known about nanomaterials to enable such extrapolation.
Third, it appears that many nanomaterials are being developed in a decentralized fashion, with a significant percentage of production coming from small, dispersed facilities. As a result, the sheer number of facilities involved will hamper the gathering of information on which materials are produced, and the purpose and specific applications of the materials, as well as directing compliance and enforcement efforts to where they are needed. Additionally, much of the production, processing, and use of these materials will take place in facilities that may lack the expertise and resources to understand and comply with environmental and occupational safeguards.
Fourth, some potential nanotechnology applications may fall through the cracks among the jurisdictions of multiple regulatory programs. For example, the Food and Drug Administration (Â"FDAÂ") reviewed sunscreens using nanoparticles of titanium dioxide for potential of immediate health effects on consumers. 32 However, neither the FDA nor the EPA appears to have reviewed how titanium dioxide nanoparticles could affect aquatic ecosystems once these sunscreens wash off.
Lastly, the pace of the regulatory process lags far behind the speed at which nanomaterials are being introduced into the market. While substances marketed as pesticides,33 fuel additives,34 or drug or food additives35 regularly receive significant scrutiny when first introduced, most other substances do not.36 As a result, occupational and environmental protections are generally developed only after problems are identified or strongly suspected in regulatory proceedings that typically take several years to complete. A more detailed discussion of specific regulatory issues under key U.S. laws follows.
U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Act
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (Â"OSHActÂ"),37 four types of regulatory mechanisms are available for protecting workers from overexposure to chemicals: substancespecific standards, general respiratory protection standards, hazard communication standards, and the Â"general duty clause.Â" Each is examined below.
As a practical matter, substance-specific occupational standards are unlikely to be set in the absence of extensive toxicology data. Currently, the vast majority of standards adopted have been based on findings of human epidemiological studies, which follow widespread exposure and take years, or even decades, to conduct. Given the relative paucity of health data on nanoparticles, it is unlikely that any nanoparticle-specific standards will be established in the reasonable future. In their absence, inhalable nanoparticles will automatically be covered by the 5 micrograms per cubic meter (Â"mg/m3Â") standard that applies to Â"particulates not otherwise regulated,Â" sometimes called Â"nuisance dust.Â"38 Unfortunately, these mass-based standards, developed for conventional particles, are unlikely to protect workers from adverse effects of nanoparticle exposures; indeed, one study has suggested that exposure to carbon nanotubes at 5 mg/m3 for several weeks would be analogous to exposure levels found to cause lung granulomas and inflammation in rats. 39 Second, the respiratory protection standard requires employers to provide workers with respirators or other protective devices when engineering controls are not adequate to protect health.40 The standard provides guidance in selecting specific personal protective equipment and in implementing workplace respiratory protection programs. Only respirators certified by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health may be used, and employers must assess the effectiveness of the respirators they supply. The current lack of validated means to measure and characterize the form and size of nanoparticles in the air, as well as the uncertainties regarding respirator performance, especially in relation to particles between 30 and 70 nanometers and potential agglomerates around 300 nanometers, will complicate implementation of this standard. 41 Third, OSHActÂ's hazard communication standard42 stipulates that all producers or importers of chemicals are obligated to develop Material Safety Data Sheets (Â"MSDSsÂ"), which are intended to provide workers with available information on hazardous ingredients in products they handle and educate them on safe handling practices. However, even when accurate and upto-date, MSDSs have significant limitations; most notably, there is no requirement to either generate data on potential hazards or disclose the absence of any data. Moreover, in some instances, a nanomaterialÂ's MSDS has simply adopted the hazard profile for a presumedly-related bulk material. For example, an MSDS for carbon nanotubes identifies the primary component as graphite, and cites information on the hazards of graphite, without acknowledging any dissimilarity between the two substances. 43 From a scientific perspective, this makes no more sense than considering carbon nanotubes equivalent to diamonds. While graphite, diamonds, and carbon nanotubes are all composed of carbon, the physical and chemical properties of these three substances are quite distinct, reflecting their radically different molecular structures.
Finally, OSHActÂ's general duty clause44 is intended as a backstop to protect workers from certain exposures that are widely known to result in toxic effects but are not addressed specifically by an OSHA standard. The general duty clause, however, applies only to Â"recognizedÂ" hazards, a difficult criterion to meet in light of the current paucity of toxicity data on specific nanomaterials.
U.S. Toxic Substances Control Act
Beyond the occupational realm, the array of potential environmental regulatory authorities initially appears impressive. These include the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, which addresses management of hazardous and other solid wastes, and the Toxic Substances Control Act (Â"TSCAÂ"), which covers commercial chemicals other than those used as drugs, food additives, cosmetics, fuel additives, and pesticides. Yet, most existing regulations under these statutes are not directly relevant to nanomaterials. Moreover, adopting new standards would require that the EPA launch lengthy, data-intensive rulemaking processes that would take years to complete. 45 Certain provisions of TSCA, however, currently apply and may be the most immediate way for the EPA to regulate at least some nanomaterial applications. Enacted in 1976, TSCA authorizes the EPA to regulate chemicals that are processed, imported, manufactured, distributed in commerce, used, or disposed of in the United States upon finding that they pose an Â"unreasonable risk.Â"46
As further discussed below, TSCA also has certain provisions under which the EPA can review the safety of new chemicals before they enter commerce. Â"NewÂ" chemicals, as defined by the TSCA, are those not included in the initial Inventory of Chemicals in Commerce completed in 1980, or subsequently added to the Inventory after going through the new-chemical review process. 47 As of 2005, the EPA had reviewed more than 40,000 new chemicals prior to their introduction into commerce, and had restricted or otherwise regulated 1,600, or four percent, of these chemicals. 48 At first blush, TSCA appears to provide the EPAwith a fairly broad authority to regulate new chemicals. As noted in the Conference Report accompanying TSCAÂ's enactment:
[T]he most desirable time to determine the health and environmental effects of a substance, and to take action to protect against any potential adverse effects, occurs before commercial production begins. Not only is human and environmental harm avoided or alleviated, but also the cost of any regulatory action in terms of loss of jobs and capital investments is minimized. For these reasons the conferees have given the Administrator broad authority to act during the [premanufacture] notification period. 49 Specifically, section 5 of TSCA requires the producer of a Â"newÂ" chemical substance to send EPA a Â"Pre-Manufacture NotificationÂ" (Â"PMNÂ") before beginning to produce a substance. At least in theory, PMNs allow the EPA to review and assess the potential risks of a new material before it reaches the market and, if necessary, to require that a producer provide further information, or limit the chemicalÂ's use.
Unfortunately, there are no baseline data requirements for PMNs, and 85 percent of PMNs are submitted without any health data.50 Although the EPA can request additional data, it rarely does so; instead, it typically conducts its review based on use of structure-activity relationship models.
This model estimates the toxicological properties of an unstudied substance, based on the extent of molecular structural similarity to substances with known toxicological properties. Existing models have little applicability to nanomaterials, because the models are based on the properties of bulk forms of conventional chemical substances, and because nanomaterialsÂ' novel and enhanced properties result from characteristics other than their molecular structure, e.g. size or shape. It Page 7 of 18 Nanotechnology: Getting it Right the First Time 12/8/2007 http://www.organicconsumers.org/articles/article_2152.cfm remains to be seen whether the EPAwill require actual toxicity data on nanomaterials to be submitted as part of the PMN review process.
Other key questions also remain unresolved, including the extent to which nanomaterials qualify as Â"newÂ" chemicals, which is necessary to trigger PMN requirements. Under TSCA, a Â"newÂ" chemical is one that is not already listed on the TSCA Inventory of chemicals in commerce and is of Â"a particular molecular identity.Â" 51 Although it is obvious that a nanomaterial constitutes a Â"newÂ" chemical if its molecular formula is not already on the TSCA Inventory, some parties assume that a nanomaterial qualifies as Â"existing,Â" i.e. not new and therefore not subject to PMN review, if its molecular structure is identical to a substance already on the Inventory. By this logic, carbon nanotubes would not require PMNs, because graphite is already listed on the TSCA Inventory. As of January 2006, only about ten PMNs or PMN exemption requests had been submitted to the EPA, even though a much larger number of nanomaterials appear on the market in the United States.52 Of these, the EPA had approved only one: a low-release/low-exposure PMN exemption for a carbon nanotube, 53 under which the manufacturer typically must submit a full PMN once production exceeds a specified volume.
Environmental Defense has urged the EPA to clarify that nanomaterials with existing molecular structures still constitute Â"newÂ" substances unless their chemical and physical properties are demonstrably identical to those of the conventional substance. This definition is based on the grounds that only substances with the same properties, as well as the same molecular structure, share Â"a particular molecular identity.Â"54
Environmental Defense also urged the EPA not to apply massbased, or other exemptions in the PMN program, unless the underlying scientific rationale is appropriate when applied to nanomaterials.55 In addition to its pre-manufacture review provisions, TSCA also provides for certain information-gathering authorities. For example, section 8(a) authorizes the EPA to require that manufacturers provide use and exposure information; section 8(e) requires manufacturers to submit any information indicating that a substance may pose a Â"significant riskÂ" to health or to the environment; and section 8(d) authorizes the EPA to require manufacturers to submit all toxicity-related studies already in their possession. As further discussed below, the EPA is currently conducting a multi-stakeholder process on nanomaterial risks in order to design a voluntary initiative and consider possible uses of TSCA authorities.
Finally, section 6 of TSCA theoretically authorizes the EPA to restrict the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, and disposal of chemical substances if Â"there is a reasonable basis to concludeÂ" that its manufacture, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal Â"presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.Â"56 However, as a practical matter, the procedural requirements associated with section 6 are so complex that these provisions have seldom been used.57
Federal Consumer Products Laws
As noted above, TSCAdoes not cover certain chemical substances. In particular, TSCA does not cover pesticides, which the EPA regulates under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. TSCA additionally does not cover food, food additives, drugs, cosmetics, or medical devices, which the FDA regulates under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
However, although cosmetics are excluded from TSCA, they are not subject to FDA pre-market approval authority.58 As also is noted above, fuel additives, including a nanomaterial-based additive now under review by the EPA,59 are covered by specific provisions of the Clean Air Act.
Unlike TSCA, the other programs require companies to submit specified data on the safety of new products before they are introduced into commerce. By definition, however, only nanomaterials used for these specific types of applications are covered by these particular programs. Moreover, the FDA acknowledges that, even if a product involving nanotechnology falls within its ambit, the agency may not even be aware that the product contains a nanomaterial, Â"if the manufacturer makes no nanotechnology claims regarding the manufacture or performance of the product.Â"60 Finally, the Consumer Product Safety Act (Â"CPSAÂ"), like TSCA, does not require pre-market testing of new products.61 As a practical matter, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, which administers the CPSA, focuses largely on injuries and poisonings, rather than chronic toxicity issues.62
ADDRESSING NANOMATERIAL RISKS: NEXT STEPS
Given the limitations of existing regulatory tools and policies, three distinct kinds of initiatives are urgently needed: first, a major increase in nanomaterial risk research; second, rapid development and implementation of voluntary standards of care, pending development of adequate regulatory safeguards; and third, updates of existing policies to address the shortcomings described above in addressing nanomaterial risk management. A wide array of stakeholders must be involved in all components of these processes, including labor groups, health organizations, consumer advocates, community groups, environmental organizations, as well as large and small businesses and the academic community.
INCREASE GOVERNMENTAL INVESTMENT IN RISK RESEARCH
The U.S. government, as the largest single investor in nanotechnology research and development, needs to spend more time and money to assess the health and environmental implications of nanotechnology, and to ensure that the critical research needed to identify potential risks is conducted expeditiously. Through the National Nanotechnology Initiative, the federal government spends more than $1 billion annually on nanotechnology research and development. 63 The U.S. government should spend at least $100 million annually on risk research for the next several years. While an annual expenditure of $100 million represents a significant increase over current levels, it is still less than ten percent of the overall federal budget for nanotechnology development. Moreover, this amount is a modest investment compared to the potential benefits of risk avoidance and the $1 trillion role that nanotechnology is projected to play in the world economy by 2015.
Given the wide-ranging set of research issues that need to be addressed, and the significant uncertainties associated with the anticipated results, there is no single Â"magic number,Â" nor precise method to determine the right dollar figure that should be expended. Nevertheless, $100 million per year represents a reasonable, lower-bound estimate of what is needed. Experts broadly agree that addressing the potential risks of nanotechnol-ogy will be an unusually complex task.
Despite its name, nanotechnology is anything but singular; it is a potentially limitless collection of technologies and associated materials. The sheer diversity of potential materials and applications, which is a source of nanotechnologyÂ's enormous promise, also poses major challenges with respect to characterizing potential risks. ExpertsÂ' assessments, testing costs associated with hazard characterization programs for conventional chemicals, and comparison to the research budgets for a roughly analogous risk characterization effort on risks of airborne particulate matter further buttress the call for greatly expanded health and environmental research spending.72
Current federal initiatives on nanotechnology have made significant achievements in accentuating and accelerating the enormous potential benefits of nanomaterials. To date, however, federal agencies have not fulfilled their equally critical role in identifying, managing, and ideally avoiding the potential downsides. A far better balance between these two roles must be struck if nanotechnology is to deliver on its promise, without delivering unintended and unforeseen adverse consequences.
But the U.S. government should not be the sole, or even the principal, funder of nanomaterial risk research. Other governments are also spending heavily to promote nanotechnology research and development, and they too should allocate some portion of their spending to address nanotechnology risks. Indeed, the United KingdomÂ's Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering, in its seminal July 2004 report, Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: Opportunities and Uncertainties, calls for the U.K. government to devote Â£5-6 million (US $9.5-11.3 million) per annum for ten years, to do its part to develop the methodologies and instrumentation needed to set the stage for actual testing of nanomaterials.73
Although government risk research plays a critical role in the development of basic knowledge and methods for characterizing and assessing the risks of nanomaterials, private industry should fund the majority of the research and testing on the products they are planning to bring to the market. In turn, governments should focus on providing the Â"enabling infrastructureÂ" for nanotechnology research. Such research cuts across a broad range of disciplines, and will have broad impacts on society. In particular, the government can mobilize the research industry to create a database of representative, model nanomaterials. The government can also develop methods and tools needed to characterize, detect, and measure nanomaterials; to assess their biological fate and behavior; and to assess acute and chronic toxicity. Most importantly, the government can coordinate this research, and disseminate the results, thereby increasing efficiency and reducing redundancy. Clearly, all parties involved will benefit if governments and industry coordinate their research to avoid redundancy and optimize efficiency.
DEVELOP VOLUNTARY STANDARDS OF CARE
Given that federal agencies are unlikely to develop and implement adequate regulatory programs for nanomaterials quickly enough to address the products now entering or poised to enter the market, voluntary Â"standards of careÂ" for nanomaterials must play a role in guiding the safe use of nanomaterials in the near term. These standards should include a framework and a process by Finally, Environmental Defense and DuPont are working together to design and demonstrate a framework for the responsible development, production, use, and disposal of nanoscale materials.
While the project will initially pilot-test the framework on specific nanoscale materials, or on applications of interest to DuPont, the organizations intend to develop a framework that can be adapted for use by a broad range of stakeholders.
But voluntary standards by themselves are only a temporary expedient; in the longer term, regulatory programs will be essential to securing long-term public confidence and support for nanotechnology. Here again, a wide range of stakeholders believe that a nanotechnology regulatory scheme is needed. In a survey conducted by the Wilson Center, 55 percent of the 1,250 respondents stated that government control beyond voluntary standards was necessary, while only eleven percent felt that voluntary standards were adequate.77 According to a recent report on nanotechnology by Innovest, Â"[a] significant portion of the more than 60 companies we interviewed indicated an interest in having some sort of standards in place. In many cases, they felt that science-based regulation would provide a more level playing field.Â"78 In a Joint Statement of Principles submitted to the EPA, both Environmental Defense and the Nanotechnology Panel of the American Chemistry Council stated that the responsible regulation of nanomaterials Â"will best assure that nanomaterials are being developed in a way that identifies and minimizes potential risks to human health and the environment.Â"79 In an Op-Ed in the Wall
